



# **Are very carbon-intensive pathways plausible?**

*Insights from the Imaclim-R modeling framework*


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**26 Septembre 2008**

# Mixed dissatisfactions with current modeling practices and ongoing trends

- Non Plausible spread of SRES scenarios ?
- Recent criticism of Pielke et al. about BAU efficiency gains



# Mixed dissatisfactions with current modeling practices and ongoing trends

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- Recent criticism of Pielke et al. about BAU efficiency gains
- Bad control of uncertainty?

‘Kaya’ identity

$$E_{CO_2} = POP \cdot \frac{GDP}{POP} \cdot \frac{Energy}{GDP} \cdot \frac{E_{CO_2}}{Energy}$$

**Economic growth:**  
productivity, catch-up

**Carbon intensity :** energy mix,  
sequestration

**Energy intensity :** efficiency  
gains, dematerialization,  
structural change

# Mixed dissatisfactions with current modeling practices and ongoing trends

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Mean Productivity growth rate	Rate of decoupling between GDP and Emissions		
	1.9 % /an	2.0 % /an	2.1 % /an
	<b>0.9 % par an</b>	1733 GtC	1628 GtC
	<b>1.0 % par an</b>	1992 GtC	1868 GtC
<b>1.1 % par an</b>		<b>2229 GtC</b>	2152 GtC
		<b>1530 GtC</b>	


# Mixed dissatisfactions with current modeling practices and ongoing trends

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
- Non Plausible spread of SRES scenarios ?
  - Recent criticism of Pielke et al. about BAU efficiency gains
  - Bad control of uncertainty?
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- The intuition that the future drivers of growth and of its physical content are likely to be very carbon intensive
    - Growth dynamics in emerging and developing countries will require an extraordinary amount of materials and energy (consumption + investments)
    - Fossil fuels have a large competitiveness margin
    - Transportation demand is likely to grow steeply despite tensions on oil prices
  - Recently observed trends warns us against global optimism (Raupach et al.)
    - Current emissions profile is to exceed upper SRES bound
    - Current stagnation of carbon intensity

# An improved consistency requires to represent underlying mechanisms

‘Kaya’ identity



# What would we like to represent?




# Main modeling principles

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- An **hybrid modelling** in physical and money flows so as to
  - Ensure that the technological progress embodied in global growth is consistent with sector - based expertise
  - Ensure global macroeconomic consistencies and inter-sector feedbacks
- A **growth engine with disequilibrium ...**
  - With imperfect foresight and routine behaviours
  - With energy (and other) price cycles
  - Allowing for structural imbalances (unemployment...) and endogenous shocks
- Endogenized structural and technical changes in order to represent internal macro economic feedbacks



# A recursive and modular architecture: static equilibria + dynamic relations informed by sector based expertise



# An ‘agnostic’ attitude toward BAU scenarii

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
- The model allows for
  - Consistent interactions of various assumptions
  - A complex computation
- Change the procedure: from assumptions to unknown results
  - Demography from UN 1998 central scenario.
  - Mimetic catch-up of development styles.
  - Central assumptions on technologies costs and oil reserves (3.4 Tbl)
  - Median GDP growth, world GDP x7.7 between 2001 and 2100

# A Sensitivity Test on underlying drivers of emissions


	Scenarios	Assumptions
Optimism on energy supply	Optimism on oil reserves	+30% reserves
Optimism on end-uses technologies	Optimism on AEEI	AEEI*1.5
	Optimism on truck, bus and train technologies	Energy efficiency improvement: speed*1.33
	Optimism on car technologies	Learning rate*3
	Optimism on residential end-uses technologies	Energy efficiency +30% in 2050
“Energy sober” development style	Lower freight content of growth	Decrease following AEEI
	Lower material content of consumption	Saturation level*0.66
	Slower car equipment	Elasticity to revenue*0.66

# Overall look on global CO2 emissions

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


# “Kaya” diagram: non trivial interactions!




# The risks of carbon-intensive lock-in are highly dependent on signals from energy markets and regulatory uncertainty

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
# Efficiency improvement may have a masking effect on oil prices

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
## Controlling upstream emissions drivers could slow down technical progress to low carbon technologies

**Slowdown of efficiency gains on car engines  
because of a lower use of personal vehicles**




# Sectoral Rebound effects

## Emissions from personal transportation: Comparison between the optimist case with the reference case




# Sectoral Rebound effects

## Emissions from personal transportation: Comparison between the optimist case with the reference case



# Macroeconomic Rebound effects

## Variation du PIB mondial par rapport au scénario central



# A challenging transition for an attractive future

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Category	Radiative forcing (W/m <sup>2</sup> )	CO <sub>2</sub> concentration <sup>c)</sup> (ppm)	CO <sub>2</sub> -eq concentration <sup>c)</sup> (ppm)	Global mean temperature increase above pre-industrial at equilibrium, using “best estimate” climate sensitivity <sup>b), c)</sup> (°C)	Peaking year for CO <sub>2</sub> emissions <sup>d)</sup>	Change in global CO <sub>2</sub> emissions in 2050 (% of 2000 emissions) <sup>d)</sup>
I	2.5-3.0	350-400	445-490	2.0-2.4	2000-2015	-85 to -50
II	3.0-3.5	400-440	490-535	2.4-2.8	2000-2020	-60 to -30
III	3.5-4.0	440-485	535-590	2.8-3.2	2010-2030	-30 to +5
IV	4.0-5.0	485-570	590-710	3.2-4.0	2020-2060	+10 to +60
V	5.0-6.0	570-660	710-855	4.0-4.9	2050-2080	+25 to +85
VI	6.0-7.5	660-790	855-1130	4.9-6.1	2060-2090	+90 to +140

IPCC, 2007